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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Attachment of the Sixth Amend-
ment Right to Counsel in Mississippi - Yates v. State, 467
So. 2d 884 (Miss. 1984), reh'g denied, No. 54415 (May 15,
1985)
FACTS
Jeff Oliver Yates, eighteen years old, shot and killed Roger
Byron Hollingsworth on the evening of July 29, 1981.1 He was
arrested on August 4, 1981, for the murder of Hollingsworth at
approximately 9:00 P.M. and informed of his Miranda rights.' He
was then taken to the Jones County Sheriffs Department and in-
carcerated. He was not questioned upon his arrival. Shortly there-
after, an attorney hired by Yates's parents arrived at the jail and
asked to see him. The sheriff refused, claiming that Yates had
not been charged with anything, that he had not requested an at-
torney,3 and that if he did, the attorney would be allowed to see
him. Jeff Yates did not know that the attorney was present or that
his parents had hired counsel to represent him.
A few hours later, at approximately 1:00 A.M., August 5, 1981,
Yates was taken from his cell to a deputy room upstairs in the
jail. Six officers were present, including the sheriff. Yates was
again informed of his Miranda rights and asked whether he un-
derstood them. He replied that he understood his rights and chose
to waive them by signing a waiver form,' which he also ac-
1. The two had been quarreling for some time over Yates's estranged wife, who had been dating Hollings-
worth up until the time of the shooting. She was the only witness, and it was her later statement that led to
Yates's arrest. Her confession was not used as evidence at the trial. Yates v. State, 467 So. 2d 884 (Miss.
1984), reh'g denied, No. 54415 (May 15, 1985). The court's denial of a petition for rehearing has not been
published except as a notation in the original opinion. See Yates, 467 So. 2d at 884.
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The hallmark of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is the Miranda warnings, which must be given when "an individual is taken into custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way." Id. at 478. The Court stated that he
must be afforded the following procedural safeguards:
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires.
Id. at 479.
3. Abstract of Record, July 19, 1982, at 7. Yates claimed that he had requested an attorney when he
first arrived, but said he was told to get into his cell and wait. None of the officers questioned at trial were
asked if Yates requested an attorney upon his arrival. 467 So. 2d at 885.
4. A common example of a waiver form, quoting from Commonwealth v. McKenna, 244 N.E.2d 560
(Mass. 1969), states:
I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make
a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what
I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind
has been used against me.
Id. at 562.
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knowledged that he understood. He made no request for an attor-
ney and proceeded to give a detailed account of the shooting on
tape. None of the interrogating officers were informed by the
sheriff that an attorney for Yates was in the building.
Yates met with his attorney for the first time later that same
morning around 10:00 A.M., and his attorney told him that he did
not have to sign anything. Later that afternoon Yates was presented
with a copy of his transcribed statement and was again informed
of his Miranda rights. He was then asked if he wanted to sign
the statement, and he agreed, signing each page of the twenty-
page confession.' Shortly thereafter, formal charges were brought
against him for the murder of Hollingsworth.
On July 27, 1982, Jeff Yates was tried for murder in the Cir-
cuit Court for the First Judical District of Jones County, found
guilty, and sentenced to serve a term of life imprisonment. He
appealed the conviction, claiming that his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination had been violated. Yates con-
tended that because his attorney had been denied access to him,
he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his rights, and that
as a result his statement was inadmissible. He argued that this
denial had also deprived him of his sixth amendment right to coun-
sel.' The Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi affirmed the
decision of the trial court, holding that the confession was purged
of any primary taint and therefore admissible because Yates had
signed it after again receiving his Miranda rights and after con-
ferring with counsel.
BACKGROUND
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination7 and
the sixth amendment right to counsel" were made applicable to
the states via the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Both are constitutional safeguards for the protection of individuals
5. Yates claimed that he was coerced into signing the statement by the officers' telling him they were go-
ing to use it against him regardless. Abstract of Record, July 19, 1982, at 7. If this is true and Yates's sixth
amendment rights had attached, this is a clear violation of his sixth amendment right to counsel. See infra
text accompanying notes 190-96.
6. Appellant's assignment of error read as follows: "The trial court erred in allowing the statement made
by the Appellant into evidence as it was not given with the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of his
rights, and as he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel." Brief of Appellant at 1, Yates
v. State, 467 So. 2d 884 (1984), reh'g denied, No. 54415 (May 15, 1985).
7. U. S. Const. amend. V, which provides that: "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself ..... This amendment was made applicable to the states in Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964).
8. U.S. Const. amend. VI, which provides that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to... have the assistance of counsel for his defense." This amendment was made applicable to the states
in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1962).
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in criminal proceedings. One of the primary safeguards of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is the Miranda
warnings, which include the defendant's right to the assistance
of counsel at custodial interrogations.' The sixth amendment,
which directly provides for the assistance of counsel, attaches when
a critical stage arises in the proceedings. 0 Because both amend-
ments involve the right to the assistance of counsel, they are often
interwoven within the same judicial proceeding and used inter-
changeably when only one is applicable. 1 In custodial police in-
terrogations, 12 attorneys and courts are frequently uncertain as to
which constitutional amendment to argue, although the Supreme
Court of the United States has established some basic guidelines
to follow. 1
The Supreme Court in 1964 held in Escobedo v. Illinois' that
a defendant's statements made while in custody were inadmissi-
ble because his sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated.
Escobedo had been extensively interrogated by police while at
the same time repeatedly requesting an attorney. His attorney was
present but was denied access to Escobedo because the police
claimed they had not finished questioning him. At that time, Es-
cobedo had not yet been formally charged, but he was not free
to leave. The Court held that "when ... the [law enforcement's]
focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession
our adversary system begins to operate, and . . . the accused must
be permitted to consult with his lawyer." 5 Therefore, it appeared
that statements made while in police custody would not be ad-
missible if the defendant's attorney was denied access to his client
and the defendant was not informed of his constitutional right to
remain silent. Escobedo did not go far enough and left judges,
legal educators, and attorneys uncertain as to exactly when and
under what circumstances the right to counsel would be deemed
violated in police custodial interrogations.16
Two years after Escobedo, in the landmark decision of Miran-
9. See supra note 2.
10. See infra note 26.
1I. See, e.g., Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713, 722 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1209 (1985).
12. Chief Justice Warren defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). See, e.g., Note, The Meaning of'Interrogation" Under
Miranda v. Arizona: Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980), 123 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 725 (1981).
13. See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
14. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). See generally Dowling, Escobedo and Beyond: The Need for a Fourteenth Amend-
ment Code of Criminal Procedure, 56 J. CruM. L. 143 (1965).
15. Id. at 492.
16. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440 and supra note 2.
19851
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
da v. Arizona,7 the Supreme Court decided to "explore some facets
of the [problem] ...and to give concrete constitutional guide-
lines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." 18 Miran-
da was arrested and, while in custody, questioned by police officers
who admittedly did not inform him of his right to have an attor-
ney present. He confessed and was subsequently convicted. The
Court reaffirmed the Escobedo decision, but did not rely on its
holding - that the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel
had been violated. Instead, the Court held that Miranda's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination had been violat-
ed, stating that "the prosecution may not use statements.., stem-
ming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards [Miranda warn-
ings] effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." "'
The Court asserted that the sixth amendment holding in Escobe-
do was merely an "explication of fifth amendment rights." °
Miranda, although requiring procedural warnings, was still some-
what unclear as to which constitutional amendment would be
implicated in police custodial interrogation cases.
One week following Miranda, the Court clarified the con-
troversy in Johnson v. New Jersey,2 stating that "[o]ur opinion
in Miranda makes it clear that the prime purpose of these rulings
[Escobedo and Miranda] is to guarantee full effectuation of the
privilege against self incrimination." 2
Logically, it follows that in cases involving custodial interro-
gation where the individual is prone to incriminate himself, if the
Miranda rights are violated, one of which is the right to counsel,
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination would be
implicated, instead of the sixth amendment right to counsel.23 This
is consistent with Escobedo in that the Escobedo decision did not
set forth procedural guidelines subsequently established in Miran-
da. Thus statements made while in custody are violations of the
17. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For recent Miranda discussions see, e.g., Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger
Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405 (1982); Note, Miranda Revisited: Broadening
The Right To Counsel During Custodial Interrogation - Commonwealth v. Sherman, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. Rev.
99 (1984); Note, Reinforcing Miranda - Restricting Interrogation After a Request For Counsel, 48 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 593 (1982); Note, Edwards v. Arizona: The Burger Court Breathes New Life Into Miranda, 69 CA LIF.
L. REV. 1734 (1981).
18. 384 U.S. at 441-42.
19. Id. at 444.
20. Id. at 442. See, e.g., Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy.
U. CHI. L.J. 405, 410 (1982).
21. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
22. Id. at 729.
23. 384 U.S. at 466. The Court stressed that "the presence of counsel... would be the adequate protective
device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the [fifth amendment]
privilege" in supporting the new warnings.
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sixth amendment's right to counsel. Since the right to counsel pro-
tects the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination dur-
ing custodial interrogation, the courts have subsequently relied
on the fifth amendment when such violations are claimed.
24Es-
cobedo has not been overruled, but is considered outdated and
limited to its facts. 7
In developing sixth amendment jurisprudence, the decisions pri-
or to and following Miranda have established certain "critical
stages"' in determining when the sixth amendment's right to coun-
sel attaches." As the Court stated in Kirby v. Illinois,"8 a bench-
mark case regarding the attachment of the sixth amendment's right
to counsel, "[I]t has been firmly established that a person's Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or
after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have initiated
.... ,9 " The Court thus concluded that if an individual has been
arrested, but no "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment" has occurred, he cannot claim that
he has been denied his sixth amendment right to counsel."0 Of
course, Miranda held that police custodial interrogations are to
be considered a critical stage. But, as stated earlier, a violation
during this period violates the accused's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, unless his sixth amendment right to
counsel has attached. 1 Thus, an overlapping occurs.
24. This is true only in those cases in which the sixth amendment right to counsel has not attached. See,
e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682 (1972) (Stewart, J., plurality); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
25. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232-33 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also Kirby v. l-
linois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (Stewart, I., plurality).
26. The "critical stage" doctrine was first defined in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), where the
Court declared that a person accused of a crime "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him." Id. at 69. The Court in Kirby refined the critical stage approach to include only
those periods that came after criminal prosecution had been initiated-only then would the sixth amendment
attach. 406 U.S. 689-90. Cases and situations where the sixth amendment is deemed to attach include: Moore
v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearing); United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (lineup during initial appearance); In re Gualt, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (trial where
loss of liberty is involved); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (appeals). Circumstances in which
the Court has held the stages not to be critical include: United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (photo
identification); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting samples); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood samples).
27. Attachment is automatic, not requiring the accused to first ask for counsel in order for his sixth amend-
ment right to counsel to attach. McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam).
28. 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (Stewart, J., plurality).
29. Id. at 688. This would be consistent with the language in Miranda that Escobedo was primarily a fifth
amendment decision, because counsel had not yet attached, as Justice Stewart explained in Kirby. Id. at 689.
30. Id. at 689. Supreme Court cases supporting the attachment criteria set forth in Kirby include: United
States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S.
220 (1977); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
31. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
In U.S. v. Guido, " after the defendant was arrested, but be-
fore any formal charges were made, he made a statement which
he later claimed was obtained by illegal interrogation. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel had not attached since he had
not been formally charged and held that the "incriminating state-
ment, if protected at all, is protected by the Fifth Amendment
rather than the Sixth."33
Although it has frequently held that the sixth amendment right
has been violated,' the Mississippi Supreme Court has rarely iden-
tified the stages it deems critical. Consequently, the court has failed
to clearly define when the sixth amendment right to counsel at-
taches in Mississippi.
In Pendergraft v. State, 5 the trial court judge instructed an at-
torney not to make contact with his client during a two-hour recess
immediately following the defendant's testimony on her own be-
half. The supreme court held that the two-hour preclusion con-
stituted reversible error in that "[t]his particular phase of the trial
is ... critical ... [to the accused] ,"'6 and that the right to coun-
sel cannot be denied at any time during the course of a trial.3 ,
That same year, in similar circumstances, even a fifteen-minute
preclusion of access to counsel violated the defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel and constituted reversible error.
The Mississippi Supreme Court, in a 1984 decision, Canna-
day v. State, 39 quoted language in Kirby v. Illinois° in determin-
ing when the right to counsel attached. The court held that since
the defendant's counsel had been appointed and criminal proceed-
ings had begun, by way of a preliminary hearing, the defendant's
"response to [a] question was made at a time when the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel had attached." '41 Therefore her sixth
amendment rights were violated because her attorney was not
present at the time. 4
The court in Cannaday, although using as a guide the critical
32. 704 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1983).
33. Id. at 676.
34. See, e.g., Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1209 (1985); Tate
v. State, 192 So. 2d 923 (Miss. 1966); Pendergraft v. State, 191 So. 2d 830 (Miss. 1966). See also Jordan
v. Watkins, 681 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1982).
35. 191 So. 2d 30 (Miss. 1966).
36. Id. at 833.
37. Id.
38. Tate v. State, 192 So. 2d 923 (Miss. 1966).
39. 455 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1209 (1985).
40. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
41. 455 So. 2d at 723.
42. Id.
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stage analysis set forth in Kirby," indicated that the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel in Mississippi would attach at an earlier
time." The Kirby plurality decision held that the right attached
when adversarial criminal proceedings commenced "by way of
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or
arraignment." It is this point "that marks the commencement of
the 'criminal prosecutions' to which alone the explicit guarantees
of the Sixth Amendment are applicable." "
Notwithstanding the critical periods enunciated in Kirby, Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-1-7 (1972) states that "[a] prosecution may be
commenced... by the issuance of a warrant, or by binding over
or recognizing the offender to compel his appearance to answer
the offense, as well as by indictment or affidavit."4 ' Therefore,
this statutory provision indicates that in Mississippi an individu-
al's sixth amendment right to counsel attaches at an earlier period
than those pronounced by the Supreme Court in Kirby. Of course,
it is fundamental in constitutional law that the Supreme Court's
guidelines are a constitutional minimum and each state is free to
require stricter standards or to broaden an individual's rights,
provided they do not run afoul of a constitutional provision. 8
This statute, § 99-1-7, is derived verbatim from Miss. CODE
ANN. § 1415 (1906)" 9 which was upheld in State v. Hughes."° In
that case, the defendant was charged with embezzlement in Attala
County. The charge was made by means of an affidavit"1 to the
justice of the peace who issued a warrant pursuant to the affidavit.
The defendant was arrested, and the justice of the peace, after a
committing trial, bound him over for indictment. The grand jury
refused to indict, but the defendant was subsequently indicted in
Hinds County for the same offense. He claimed that Hinds County
lacked jurisdiction because proceedings had already commenced
and failed in Attala County. The supreme court agreed and held
that the code section did indeed determine when a prosecution
in Mississippi commenced.5" Unfortunately, the court did not sin-
gle out which specific phrase(s) of the code it relied upon, but
43. See infra text accompanying note 45.
44. 455 So. 2d at 722.
45. 406 U.S. at 689.
46. Id. at 690.
47. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-1-7 (1972 and Supp. 1985).
48. For a discussion of state expansion of an individual's constitutional rights, see generally W. Brennan,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977); A. Howard, State
Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976).
49. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1415 (1906).
50. 96 Miss. 581, 51 So. 464 (1910).
51. In this case, the complaining party swore by means of an affidavit that Hughes had embezzeled money.
This affidavit was then presented to thejustice of the peace who, after study, decided to issue an arrest warrant.
Id. at 582, 51 So. at 464.
52. Id. at 583, 51 So. at 465.
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instead relied on the aggregate. Thus, a literal interpretation of
the statute would indicate that if an affidavit is filed or an arrest
warrant is issued, as in Hughes, this is enough to commence a
prosecution in Mississippi, and at this point the sixth amendment
right to counsel would attach. This is consistent with the language
in Kirby, which declares that the right to counsel attaches when
criminal prosecutions begin and is not inconsistent with the criti-
cal periods it sets forth for attachment.5 3 Since these periods de-
fined by the Supreme Court are minimum standards, they can be
narrowed by a state to conform with its legislative ideals for the
further protection of an individual's rights in a criminal
proceeding."4
The Mississippi Supreme Court in Hughes did not specifically
reveal which phrase or phrases of the statute it relied upon.
However, the court in Powell v. State"5 held that "[a] criminal
prosecution is not begun by the affidavit for.., a search warrant
... but [that] an additional affidavit [prior to the search warrant]
* . .must be made or obtained charging the person with the par-
ticular crime . 56 In this case, if the affidavit charging the
defendant had been made to the justice of the peace prior to his
ordering a search warrant, criminal proceedings would have begun
and the search warrant would have been valid.57
Other states have held that a prosecution can commence before
the critical stages announced in Kirby, thereby allowing the sixth
amendment right to counsel to attach at an earlier time. In State
v. McCorgary,58 the accused was arrested pursuant to a complaint
and warrant and was incarcerated. 9 Citing a Kansas statute as
supporting authority,"' the court held that the issuance of the com-
plaint and warrant commenced formal criminal proceedings. The
court, notwithstanding Kirby, held that the sixth amendment right
to counsel had attached. 1
53. See supra text accompanying note 46.
54. See supra note 48. See also Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 169, 320 A.2d 351, 353 (1974).
55. 196 Miss. 331, 17 So. 2d 524 (1944).
56. Id. at 333-34, 17 So. 2d at 524-25 (emphasis added).
57. Id. Here, a mere affidavit charging an individual with a crime resulting in either the issuance of an
arrest warrant or a search warrant would be sufficient to constitute a criminal prosecution in Mississippi. Id.
58. 218 Kan. 358, 543 P.2d 952 (1975).
59. The accused, McCorgary, was incarcerated with a police informant, who was selected by police to
gather incriminating information from McCorgary. The court held that "[ulnder these circumstances, the tes-
timony of the police informer as to incriminating statements made by the defendant while in jail pending charges
is not admissible at the defendant's trial." 218 Kan. 358, 363, 543 P.2d 952, 958 (1975).
60. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4503 (1974) states: "A defendant charged by the state of Kansas in a complaint,
information or indictment with any felony is entitled to have the assistance of counsel at every stage of the
proceeding against him . . . ." (quoted in McCorgary, 218 Kan. at 361, 543 P.2d at 956 (emphasis added)).
61. 218 Kan. at 359-60, 543 P.2d at 956, For additional cases regarding earlier periods during which an
accused's sixth amendment right to counsel attaches, see United States ex rel. Robinson v. Zelker, 468 F.2d
159 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973). But see United States v. Duvall, 537 F.2d 15 (2d Cir.
1976).
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Another decision subsequent to Kirby holding that attachment
occurred prior to the critical periods asserted there is Common-
wealth v. Richman.6" In Richman, a rape suspect was arrested
without a warrant, taken to police headquarters, and later identi-
fied as the assailant in a six-man lineup. This occurred before
any formal charge or preliminary arraignment was given. Although
Kirby held that the sixth amendment right to counsel did not ex-
tend to pretrial identification procedures occurring before prose-
cution had commenced, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
declared that "Kirby does not establish an all inclusive rule; rather,
the line to be drawn depends upon the procedure employed by
each state." 3 Furthermore, the court held that the right to coun-
sel attached in lineup situations occurring after arrest, and before
the preliminary arraignment."4
Mississippi cases reflect that when an individual is arrested and
identified in a lineup before being formally charged, the supreme
court will hold that criminal proceedings have not commenced
and that the sixth amendment right to counsel has not been vio-
lated . This is inconsistent with Kirby and § 99-1-7." Kirby states
that the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches when criminal
proceedings have begun and that this commences the criminal
prosecution. 7 The Mississippi Code states that prosecutions may
commence in Mississippi, inter alia, upon the issuance of an ar-
rest warrant. 8 Consequently, if an individual is arrested pursuant
to a warrant, his sixth amendment right to counsel has attached
because prosecution and criminal proceedings have commenced
against him. 9 Therefore, if the defendants in the aforementioned
Mississippi lineup cases were arrested pursuant to a warrant, which
the cases do not reflect, the statutory provision and its judicial
support are at variance with supreme court precedent regarding
pre-trial lineups.70 While the statute expands the accused's rights,
the court simultanteously restricts them. Unfortunately, the only
case to address the two within the same context, Cannaday v.
62. 320 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1974).
63. Id. at 353.
64. Id. See also United States ex rel. Burton v. Cuyler, 439 F. Supp. 1173 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
65. See York v. State, 413 So. 2d 1372 (Miss. 1982); Bankston v. State, 391 So. 2d 1005 (Miss. 1980);
Scott v. State, 359 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1978); Clubb v. State, 350 So. 2d 693 (Miss. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1068 (1978); Fells v. State, 345 So. 2d 618 (Miss. 1977).
66. See supra text accompanying note 47.
67. 406 U.S. at 689-90.
68. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-1-7 (1972 and Supp. 1985).
69. See supra text accompanying note 55.
70. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text (discussing cases which have interpreted § 99-1-7).
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State,7 involved a custodial police interrogation rather than a
lineup.
Since both lineup and custodial interrogation proceedings yield
evidence that can be used against the accused, one might infer
that the lineup precedent would control the custodial interroga-
tion.72 This would seem plausible, but for the reference in Can-
naday to § 99-1-7, a statute that the court had heretofore let lie
dormant for over sixty years."' If, however, the court had initial-
ly incorporated § 99-1-7 into its lineup cases, a different result
would have ensued in at least some decisions.' Nonetheless, since
the court has revived the statute, it will now have to confront the
statute in both lineup and custodial police interrogation cases. The
court must either vary the statute's meaning in lineup and cus-
todial interrogation contexts, which will be very difficult due to
its explicit content, or adjust future decisions to comply with the
statutory command.
If, in Mississippi, the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches
at an earlier stage than that delineated in Kirby, what effect will
this have if attachment has taken place prior to custodial interro-
gation? It appears that an individual will be afforded both the fifth
amendment privilege against self incrimination and the sixth
amendment right to counsel. Yet the courts refrain from judicial-
ly scrambling the two amendments within the same proceeding
and will determine at the outset which will be applicable to the
case at bar."' This is why it is imperative to determine when the
sixth amendment right to counsel attaches in a given state. For
example, before an accused is taken into custody and during cus-
todial interrogation, he is protected by his fifth amendment rights.
If he is questioned by some illegal method (usually coercion) be-
fore his sixth amendment right to counsel has attached, the court
will conclude that his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination has been violated.77 Conversely, if, after his right
to counsel has attached, the accused is interrogated or entrapped
71. 455 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1984).
72. See generally Julian, Constitutional Law - Fifth and Sixth Amendnents - 'Definitions of Custodial Inter-
rogation" Under Miranda v. Arizona and of Deliberate Elicitation" Under Massiah v. United States, 56 TUL.
L. REv. 399 (1981).
73. One of the last cases to use the present code § 99-1-7 was Atkinson v. State, 132 Miss. 377, 96 So.
310 (1923) (then section 1406, Code of 1906 (Hemingway's Code, § 1161)).
74. Depending upon the circumstances, if the sixth amendment right to counsel had attached, the results
could have been different since the sixth amendment encompasses a broader range of protection than does the
fifth amendment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1974).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977);
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Cannaday v. State,
455 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1209 (1985).
76. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n. 14 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
77. 384 U.S. at 446.
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and yields incriminating information, this will be held to be a vio-
lation of his sixth amendment rights, even though incriminating
statements were solicited during the interrogation process."'
Regardless of whether the suspect is protected by the fifth or
sixth amendment, he may still waive his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, or if right to counsel has attached, his
sixth amendment right to counsel.79 For a waiver to be effective
however, it "requires not merely comprehension," 8o but "an in-
tentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege ... [and] depend[s], in each case, upon the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the back-
ground, experience, and conduct of the accused." 8 There is, there-
fore, "a heavy burden rest[ing] on the government to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his [fifth
amendment] privilege against self-incrimination and his [sixth
amendment] right to retained or appointed counsel."" Miranda
reiterated these same principles regarding fifth amendment cus-
todial interrogation procedures and stressed that the waiver must
be voluntary and not coerced.83
Given the above criteria for an effective waiver, does this mean
that the standards for a waiver of fifth amendment rights are iden-
tical to the standards for a waiver of sixth amendment rights? The
courts are divided on this issue,8" but a comparison of effective
waivers under each amendment proves helpful.
A. Fifth Amendment Waiver
Once an accused is confronted with custodial interrogation,
Miranda requires that he be informed of certain rights before he
can effectively waive them.8 After these rights have been read
78. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 397-98 (1976).
79. See generally Kamisar, Brewer v, Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is Interrogation? When Does
It Matter? 67 GEO. L.J. 1 (1978). Professor Kamisar addresses whether the waiver standard for the sixth amend-
ment entails stricter standards than that of the fifth amendment. In essence, he concludes that since the fifth
amendment standards were based upon that of the sixth, the two are equal. Id. at 28-31.
80. 430 U.S. at 404.
81. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
82. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (quoting Escobedo v. Illinios, 378 U.S 478, 490
n. 14 (1964)); Neal v. State, 451 So. 2d 743 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 607 (1984), Depreo v.
State, 407 So. 2d 102 (Miss. 1981).
83. 384 U.S. at 476.
84. For cases that hold that the sixth amendment requires a higher standard for waiver see United States
v. Clements, 713 F.2d 1030 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 132 (1984); United States v. Barone,
467 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1972). Cases which hold that Miranda and Massiah waiver standards are the same in-
clude United States v. Karr, 742 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1984); Fields v. Wyrich, 706 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1020 (1983). For an in-depth discussion of this issue see the dissenting opinion of
Judge Simpson in United States v. Brown, 569 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1978).
85. See supra note 2.
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to him by law enforcement officers, he will be asked if he under-
stands them and, if so, whether he wishes to waive them." If the
accused indicates that he understands them and wishes to talk,
he will be deemed to have voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
waived his rights.87
The next fact situation which frequently arises is somewhat
different. This time the accused, confronted with custodial inter-
rogation, states that he wants to remain silent - that he does not
want to talk to anyone. The Supreme Court held in Michigan v.
Mosley"' that once an accused desires to remain silent Miranda
requires that his request be "scrupulously honored" by law en-
forcement officials. The Court did not define "scrupulously
honored," but did state that it did not mean "a blanket prohibition
against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immu-
nity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances.""
The question remains: How long and under what circumstances
would the "scrupulously honored" test be deemed satisfied before
police could resume questioning or approach the accused.
The third instance arises when the accused, in a custodial in-
terrogation, states that he wants an attorney - that he will not
answer any questions until one is provided for him. The Supreme
Court in Edwards v. Arizona" held in this situation that "an ac-
cused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with police only
through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless
the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges
or conversations with the police." 91
Therefore, once counsel is requested in a Miranda setting, a
waiver occurs only when the accused comes forward and initi-
ates contact. Only then will the waiver be considered knowingly
and intelligently made.92 The accused may not in this instance,
unlike the previous two, be approached by law enforcement offi-
cials and asked whether he desires to waive his rights.9
In all three fact situations above, once the accused has deter-
mined that he wishes to waive his rights, the court will then exam-
86. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
87. The court will also look to the circumstances surrounding the waiver to determine whether the waiver
is valid. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
88. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
89. Id. at 102.
90. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
91. Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added).
92. Id.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 85-90.
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ine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the waiver to
determine whether it was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
made." If the circumstances reflect that the accused voluntarily
waived his rights and that he understood the effect of his action,
there will be an effective waiver."' If not, the statements made
by the accused will be suppressed.96
Where the accused has either requested to remain silent or has
asserted his right to counsel, or both, is it necessary for him to
be read his Miranda rights again once he decides to waive them?
The courts are undecided on this issue, but the safest measure
would be for law enforcement officials to reread the Miranda
rights."'
The Supreme Court of Mississippi adheres to the standards set
forth above to secure an effective waiver of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.98 The court has held that for
a waiver to be valid the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the waiver must be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.9
B. Sixth Amendment Waiver
Once the sixth amendment right to counsel has attached,"' the
defendant may only waive this right if he initiates contact with
law enforcement officers.1' This is true even though counsel has
not yet been appointed."0 2 This test seems to be identical to the
fact situation in a fifth amendment Miranda waiver where the ac-
cused has asserted his right to counsel."'3 But here, if the defen-
dant has decided to waive his right to counsel, must he specifically
state that he desires to waive this right or would a reading of the
Miranda warnings and a subsequent waiver be sufficient? This
question presents the issue of whether the sixth amendment re-
quires a higher standard of waiver than that of the fifth amend-
ment. The courts are divided."'
In Mississippi, because a waiver of both an accused's fifth and
94. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
95. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
96. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
97. See United States v. Brady, 421 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1970); Brown v. State, 6 Md. App. 564, 252 A.2d
272 (1969).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
99. Neal v. State, 451 So. 2d 743 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 607 (1984); see also Depreo v.
State, 407 So. 2d 102 (Miss. 1981).
100. See supra note 27.
101. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 413 (1977). See also infra text accompanying notes 211-14.
102. McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96.
104. See supra note 84.
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sixth amendment rights must be proved by the prosecution be-
yond a reasonable doubt,"'5 the standards for an effective waiver
appear to be the same. But the supreme court has not addressed
whether a rereading of the Miranda warnings would suffice as
a waiver of an accused's sixth amendment right to counsel.
INSTANT CASE
The majority opinion delivered by the Mississippi Supreme
Court recognized that the "prime issue" was whether the defen-
dant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to coun-
sel before he made his confession." The majority discussed the
facts in a Miranda style, presumably because a custodial police
interrogation was involved, but never stated that the decision would
be based on the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination rather than the sixth amendment's right to counsel."0 7
Unexpectedly, the court then made reference to the sixth amend-
ment when it stated that Yates "contends on appeal that the fact
that he was not notified of the presence of counsel deprived him
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel." "'t The court should
have stopped here and explained the difference between the two
amendments and when each applied, and should then have iden-
tified the one applicable in the instant case. The dissenting opin-
ion did just that,"° using the Kirby language in Cannaday to
conclude that the sixth amendment had not yet attached in this
case. In contrast, the majority opinion proceeded along fifth
amendment lines, although it referred to a sixth amendment case."'
The court then briefly discussed three lines of cases that dealt
with denial of counsel by law enforcement officers and the im-
pact this denial has when an accused chooses to waive his rights
without knowing of the attorney's presence or that one had been
obtained for him. Each of these cases was considered using a fifth
105. Neal v. State, 451 So. 2d 743, 757 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 607 (1984).
106. 467 So. 2d at 884. Here, the court does not state whether the waiver involves Yates's fifth amendment
right to counsel or sixth. It is possible to waive the fifth amendment right to the assistance of counsel without
waiving the sixth amendment right to counsel. See United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 380 (5th Cir. 1983),
reh g denied, 714 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1983).
107. See supra note 106.
108. 467 So. 2d at 885. The court here is applying fifth amendment language and case law but claims the
issue may also involve the sixth amendment. This ambiguity was dealt with in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Sullivan.
109. Id. 888-89.
110. The majority refers to Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), in demonstrating that an effective
waiver can occur out of the presence of counsel. Although Brewer is a sixth amendment case, its mention
of a valid waiver applies both to the fifth and sixth amendments. Nonetheless, the court should have used a
fifth amendment case to support this proposition. See, e.g., Weed v. State, 406 So. 2d 24 (Miss. 1981); Smith
v. State. 229 So. 2d 551 (Miss. 1969).
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amendment analysis.11 From these cases the court selected the
one which it claimed to be applicable in Mississippi. The court
held that when the attorney was denied access to Yates, even
though Yates had no knowledge that one had been hired to
represent him, this rendered his waiver invalid because it was not
knowingly and voluntarily made and tainted his confession."12 This
holding was based upon Commonwealth v. McKenna,"' which
set forth the proposition that when police are informed of the
presence of the accused's attorney, they must notify the accused
of such before his waiver can be considered knowing and volun-
tary."' The court rejected the People v. Hobson... rule, which
requires that when an attorney enters the proceedings, there can-
not be a valid waiver of the right to counsel unless the attorney
is present." 6 The court also discarded the rule in State v. Bur-
bine, 7 holding that there can be a valid waiver even though the
accused is not informed of the presence of counsel. 1 8
By adopting the McKenna rule, the court takes a middle posi-
tion when compared to Hobson and Burbine. Simply stated, even
though the accused must be informed that an attorney has requested
to see him, this does not require the attorney's presence if the ac-
cused desires to waive his right to counsel. Unfortunately, the
court neither gave its reasoning for adopting the new rule nor any
insight into how it would be applied in the context of police cus-
todial interrogations.
Having concluded that the waiver was not knowingly and volun-
tarily made, and that therefore Yates's confession was tainted, the
court addressed the issue of whether a subsequent Miranda warn-
ing coupled with Yates's signing of a transcript of his confession,
after he had consulted with his attorney, purged the confession
of the primary taint." 9 The court, taking into consideration the
total circumstances of the case, determined that the taint was
purged, thus rendering the confession admissible.' °
I11. The court, however, failed to note that People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d
419 (1976), is a sixth amendment case since the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel had attached. But
note that Hobson is generally applicable to both fifth and sixth amendment situations. See generally Y. KAMISAR,
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 656-58 (1980).
112. 467 So. 2d at 886.
113. 355 Mass. 313, 244 N.E.2d 560 (1969).
114. Id. at 324, 244 N.E.2d at 566.
115. 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976).
116. Id.
117. 451 A.2d 22 (R.I. 1982), revd sub nom. Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178 (lst. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106
S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
118. Id.
119. For the definition of "taint" and the methods of purging it, see infra note 147 and accompanying text.
120. 467 So. 2d at 886-87.
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The dissent strongly objected to the fact that the majority had
not (1) distinguished between the fifth and sixth amendments, (2)
justified the reasoning behind the finding of the taint, (3) set forth
any new rule for law enforcement officers to follow regarding
an attorney's request to see his client, or (4) sufficiently explained




While the majority recognized the case in the context of both
fifth and sixth amendment rights, its decision is premised solely
on fifth amendment grounds.' The dissent, however, initially
thought it necessary to address which amendment it considered
to be applicable and concluded that the fifth was at issue .12' Need-
less to say, it seems wasteful for the court to single out one amend-
ment over the other in a lengthy discussion if the result would
always be the same. This is true especially since an effective
waiver could nullify both fifth and sixth amendment rights,'124 mak-
ing it clear that after Yates had signed his confession transcript
after meeting with his attorney and again being given his Miranda
rights, any taint that the initial waiver had incurred was removed.
The question is, then, why do courts put so much emphasis on
determining which constitutional amendment applies? The answer
is that since two distinct amendments have different functions,
each has its own judicial precedent. If the court determines that
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is impli-
cated, it will derive its rationale from the Miranda line of cases. 1
25
If the sixth amendment's right to counsel has attached, the court
should review the case in light of sixth amendment Massiah prece-
dent. 1' This is necessary to avoid any conflict between the two
amendments when the court is arriving at a decision. This not
only saves time, but also prevents the intermingling of the two,
thus avoiding confusion while establishing that the fifth and sixth
amendments are distinct and should be kept separate.
1 7
121. Id. at 888-92.
122. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
123. 467 So. 2d at 888-89.
124. See supra note 79.
125. See Kanisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is Interrogation? When Does it Matter?
67 GEO L. 1(1978). Professor Kamisar, in an excellent discussion, distinguishes sixth amendment cases from
fifth amendment cases regarding police custodial situations. He refers to fifth amendment precedent as deriv-
ing from Miranda while sixth amendment precedent is a product of Massiah. Id. at 3-24.
126. id.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 380 (5th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 714 F.2d 544 (5th
Cir. 1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713, 722 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1209 (1985) (where
the courts indicate why the two should not be intermingled).
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In order to determine whether the outcome would demand differ-
ent results viewed in light of the sixth amendment, it will be neces-
sary to (a) analyze the opinion along its present fifth amendment
lines; (b) consider when the sixth amendment attaches in Missis-
sippi, and whether it has attached in this case; (c) analyze the opin-
ion along sixth amendment lines; and (d) compare the results
reached by each amendment to determine if the results differ, and,
if so, in what respects.
A. Fifth Amendment Outcome
The fifth amendment requires that after an individual is taken
into custody, but before he is questioned, he must be informed
of his Miranda rights.1"8 If not, the statements cannot be used
against him, since they are solicited in violation of his fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination.129
Jeff Yates was arrested and immediately informed of his Miran-
da rights. He was not questioned until he was taken upstairs in
the jail. His Miranda rights were read to him again, and he ac-
knowledged that he understood them. Yates could have ended the
interrogation at this point if he had wished by simply requesting
an attorney before he would entertain any questions. 3 ' If ques-
tioning continued, any statement would be considered the "product
of compulsion" or coercion, which the fifth amendment protects
against."' Instead, he decided that he wanted to talk and signed
a waiver of rights form.32 and began to incriminate himself by
responding to questioning.
The officers in the interrogation room all testified that Yates
made no request for counsel, that he understood his rights and
wished to waive them, and that he was not promised anything
nor were any threats made against him.'33 This conformed pre-
cisely to Miranda standards for an effective waiver."3 But this
seemingly perfect rendition of Miranda was not without fault. Be-
cause Yates's attorney was denied access to him, the majority found
his waiver to be outside the knowing and voluntary standard, and
his confession tainted as a result.'35 The court chose to follow the
128. See supra note 2.
129. 384 U.S. at 467.
130. id. at 445. Chief Justice Warren made it clear that "if the individual ... indicates in any manner that
he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him." Id.
131. Id. at 474.
132. See supra note 4.
133. Abstract of Record, July 19, 1982, at 5.
134. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
135. 467 So. 2d at 886. When evidence is tainted, it is said to be fruit of a poisonous tree. Basically, "the
rule states that evidence derived from information acquired by police officials through unlawful means is not
admissible in a criminal prosecution." C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 30 (1980). See also Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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Commonwealth v. McKenna"3 6 line of cases requiring that when
police are "notified of the presence, either by phone or in person,
of the defendant's attorney, the obligation [exists for them] to in-
form the defendant of the fact before the defendant's waiver of
right to counsel can be considered knowing and voluntary."1 7
The court refused to adopt the more restrictive rule of People
v. Hobson,"3 8 requiring the presence of the attorney for the ac-
cused before the waiver is considered valid.1"9 The rule in State
v. Burbine"'° would have avoided the entire issue of taint and the
subsequent purging of the taint.. if it had been followed. Its sim-
ple formula is that there can be an effective waiver even though
the accused is not informed that his counsel is present. "Although
the court gave no reason, the most probable rationale for avoid-
ing the Burbine approach would be the language in Miranda, which
established that "any evidence that the accused was threatened,
tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will.., show that the defendant
did not voluntarily waive his privilege."' Although the inter-
rogating officers had no knowledge that Yates's attorney was
present, the sheriff did, and he was among the interrogators.
1 44
Of the three, the McKenna rationale is the most practical be-
cause it provides the accused protection if he is not informed of
his attorney's presence, but yet is not so rigid as to require the
physical presence of the attorney if the accused wishes to waive
his right to the assistance of counsel.
The court concluded that the confession was tainted and would
be inadmissible unless subsequent events occurred to dissipate the
taint or weaken it to a point where it would no longer be con-
sidered "fruit of a poisonous tree." ' If this taint or primary ille-
gality is dissipated, the confession will be admissible.1 4'6 Factors
to be considered are:
[1] the break in time ... between the [two] confessions; [2] whether [the] defendant was
given renewed Miranda warnings ... [3] [w~hen the timing and conditions of the confes-
136. 355 Mass. 313, 244 N.E.2d 560 (1969).
137. 467 So. 2d at 885, (citing Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 324, 244 N.E.2d 560, 566
(1969)).
138. 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976).
139. The court may have refused to adopt this rule since the Hobson decision was premised on sixth amend-
ment grounds because the defendant's right to counsel had attached. See supra note I I1.
140. 451 A.2d 22 (R.I. 1982), revd sub non. Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178 (lst Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106
S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
141. For methods of purging the primary taint, see infra text accompanying note 147.
142. 451 A.2d at 29-30.
143. 384 U.S. at 476.
144. 467 So. 2d at 888.
145. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
146. See generally C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 30-37 (1980).
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sion are "so close that" the facts of one control the character of the other... [4]
[t]hat the defendant remained in custody and was denied access to counsel . . . [5] the
persistence of the conditions that caused the initial confession to be involuntary during
later questioning... land][6] [tlhat [the] defendant initiated contact with the police prior
to making the later confessions .... '
The majority, although not expressing that they had taken these
factors into account, examined two of them while basing their
opinion on the "totality of the circumstances." 148 First, they con-
sidered Yates's opportunity to consult with his attorney, thereby
altering the condition from the first confession. Second, the court
considered the fact that Yates again received his Miranda rights
before signing his confession. Together, these were enough in
the majority's mind to purge the confession of its primary taint.""9
This seems to be consistent with the Supreme Court decision in
Oregon v. Elstad. "o In that case the accused made an incriminat-
ing statement before his Miranda rights were given. When his
rights were read to him for the first time, an hour later, he chose
to waive them and incriminated himself. At trial, he sought to
suppress his confession claiming that it was tainted by his earlier
pre-Miranda statement. The Supreme Court held that since the
second statement was voluntarily made and not the product of coer-
cion, that "[n]o... purpose is served by imputing 'taint' to sub-
sequent statements obtained pursuant to a voluntary and knowing
waiver." 1"1
Elstad is similar, but clearly distinguishable from the present
case. Jeff Yates's confession was tainted because his counsel was
denied access to him. This rendered his waiver invalid. The court
held this taint was purged after he had conferred with counsel,
been informed of his Miranda rights again, and subsequently
signed a transcribed confession. This was not a new confession
as in Elstad. It was a product of his tainted confession. Yates did
not sign another waiver form and was even told that his confes-
sion would be used against him regardless. This was clearly coer-
cive conduct which was not present in Elstad, where the defendant
voluntarily signed away his rights in noncoercive surroundings.
If anything, Elstad supports the dissenting opinion in the present
case in that Yates did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his
rights.1" 2
The dissent launched a vigorous attack of significant merit based
147. Holleman v. Duckworth, 700 F.2d 391,396 (1983). See also Brown v. linois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975).
148. 467 So. 2d at 886-87.
149. Id.
150. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
151. Id. at 1298.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 153-56.
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on other factors not addressed by the majority. First, the dissent
considered significant the relatively short span of time between
the first confession and the signing of the transcript. Second, the
dissent discussed the fact that Yates was not asked to go through
another interrogation, but was simply handed a transcript to be
signed. The dissent considered these factors questionable law en-
forcement conduct in that Yates might have thought twice before
incriminating himself again if faced with another interrogation."5 3
Signing a confession could be considered a mere formality when
faced with a stack of incriminating documents, especially when
he was informed that they were going to be used against him
regardless of whether they were signed. Finally, Yates had never
been out of police custody and therefore was never afforded the
opportunity to come forward and confess of his own volition."5 '
The key under Elstad is whether the second confession is the
product of a free will, taking into consideration the facts of each
case."5 Whether the majority was balancing the factors is not
known, but it appears that if they were, the weight of the scales
would have been in favor of Yates, especially when voluntari-
ness of a confession in Mississippi must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. 5 6
This opinion, evolving from and primarily decided upon Miran-
da and fifth amendment grounds, resulted in a very controversial
5-4 decision, but set precedent regarding fifth amendment rights
in Mississippi. The only question that remains is whether the con-
troversial decision would have produced a similar result if the
court had found that Yates's sixth amendment rights had attached.
B. Attachment of the Sixth Amendment in Mississippi
In Cannaday v. State,"5 7 the Mississippi Supreme Court was
confronted with the question of when the sixth amendment right
to counsel attached in Mississippi. The court first looked to the
language in Kirby v. Illinois,"' which held that the right to coun-
sel attached when the adversary system began or commenced the
prosecution"5 9 "by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, in-
dictment, information or arraignment." " The court then addressed
the issue of when a prosecution begins in Mississippi and referred
153. 467 So. 2d at 892-93.
154. Id.
155. 105 S. Ct. at 1298.
156. Neal v. State, 451 So. 2d 743, 753 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 834 (1983).
157. 455 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1209 (1985).
158. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
159. 406 U.S. at 688.
160. Id. at 689.
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to § 99-1-7 of the Mississippi Code, which states that it may com-
mence "by the issuance of a warrant, or by binding over or recog-
nizing the offender to compel his appearance to answer the offense,
as well as by indictment or affidavit."161
A comparison of the code provision to the critical periods enun-
ciated in Kirby,"2 which were later reiterated in Moore v. Illinois,"63
indicates that prosecution commences at an earlier time period
in Mississippi. Since an affidavit or issuance of a warrant pre-
cedes the Kirby critical periods, Mississippi has decided to con-
stitutionally broaden an accused's rights by requiring earlier critical
periods for the attachment of the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel. ' Unfortunately, the problem in Cannaday occurred within
the overlapping range of both Kirby and the code provision. This
made it unnecessary for the court to reach into and discuss the
earlier periods established in the code." 5 However, as mentioned
earlier, previous Mississippi Supreme Court decisions have recog-
nized that an affidavit or issuance of a search warrant will consti-
tute the commencement of a prosecution in this state.' Because
these earlier periods are critical to the judicial proceeding, they
invoke the attachment of sixth amendment rights.
167
C. Sixth Amendment Outcome
A fifth amendment case, as noted earlier, derives its judicial
precedent from Miranda. A sixth amendment case, falling in line
with sixth amendment decisions, derives its precedent from Mas-
siah v. United States.168 Although sixth amendment cases predate
the Massiah decision, Massiah is usually the starting discussion
point when the sixth amendment right to counsel is claimed to
have attached. '69
In Massiah, the right to counsel had attached1 7' and the defen-
dant, Massiah, was released on bail. A co-defendant, working
with police, agreed to get Massiah into his car, where a record-
ing device had been installed, to discuss the case. Of course,
161. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-1-7 (1972). See also supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
162. 406 U.S. at 689.
163. 434 U.S. 220 (1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 919 (1979).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 39-51.
165. The periods within the code that precede the critical periods established in Kirby include the issuance
of a warrant and an affidavit claiming the accused is responsible for the offense. See supra text accompanying
note 161. See also supra note 51.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 49-57.
167. See supra note 26.
168. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
169. See supra note 125.
170. The defendant, Massiah, had been indicted on a drug charge. 377 U.S. at 201.
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Massiah made incriminating statements which were recorded by
police. 71 Massiah's attorney sought to suppress the statements and
the Supreme Court agreed, holding "that the petitioner was denied
the basic protections of. . .[the sixth amendment] when there
was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminat-
ing words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from
him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his coun-
sel.""17 Professor Kamisar claims that this holding is correct in
that when the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches, there
is no longer any need to consider whether interrogation has
occurred. ' He recognized interrogation as involving fifth amend-
ment rights and claims it is "constitutionally irrelevant regarding
sixth amendment rights.""7 " This analysis is fundamentally cor-
rect because sixth amendment rights can be violated outside of
interrogation situations."'
Escobedo followed and was decided on sixth amendment
grounds, although wrapped in fifth amendment language.7 6 Es-
cobedo's attorney was denied access to him. Although Escobedo
requested an attorney, he subsequently made an incriminating
statement which was later used against him. Because judicial
proceedings had not yet commenced in that case, his sixth amend-
ment rights had not attached. Regardless, the Supreme Court held
that his sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated. The
Supreme Court in Miranda claimed that while Escobedo main-
tained characteristics of both amendments, it was essentially a fifth
amendment decision.1
77
Brewer v. Williams178 was the next well known sixth amend-
ment case. The Court in Brewer used the Kirby attachment
periods 7 9 in determining whether the sixth amendment right to
counsel had attached. 8 ' The Court held that attachment had oc-
curred and proceeded to resolve the case along Massiah lines.18
The defendant was being transported by automobile from one
police headquarters, where he had been arraigned, to another when
171. Id. at 203.
172. Id. at 201, 206 (1964) (emphasis added).
173. Kamisar, Brewer v. Willians, Massiah, and Miranda: What is Interrogation? When Does it Matter?
67 GEO. LJ. 1, 3-4 (1978).
174. Id. at 3-4.
175. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Pendergraft v. State, 191 So. 2d 830 (Miss. 1966), reh'g
denied, 395 U.S. 941 (1969).
176. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
177. Id.
178. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
180. 430 U.S. at 398.
181. Id. at 397.
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he gave out incriminating information following a "Christian burial
speech" by one of the officers."8 2 The Court concluded that "[tihe
circumstances of this case are thus constitutionally indistinguish-
able from those presented in Massiah." 8' The Court then applied
the deliberately elicited test and held that Williams had been de-
nied his sixth amendment right to counsel when law enforcement
officers elicited incriminating statements from him after this right
had attached while in the absence of his attorney. 8 '
The deliberately elicited test was upheld three years later in Unit-
ed States v. Henry... where the defendant, after indictment, was
placed in the same cellblock with a paid informant. The infor-
mant was told by FBI agents "to be alert to any statements made
by the federal prisoners, but not to initiate any conversation with
or question Henry regarding the bank robbery." 18 A few weeks
later the agent contacted the informant and the informant told him
that he and Henry had "engaged in conversation and that Henry
had told him about the robbery."187 This information was used
against Henry at trial and he was convicted. He thereafter ap-
pealed claiming his sixth amendment right to counsel had been
violated. The Supreme Court held:
By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating state-
ments without the assistance of counsel, the government violated Henry's Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. This is not a case where, in Justice Cardozo's words, "the constable
blundered," rather, it is one where the "constable" planned an impermissible interfer-
ence with the right to the assistance of counsel.'"
Justice Powell then summarized in his concurring opinion by
stating that "[t]he rule of Massiah serves the salutary purpose of
preventing police interference with the relationship between a
suspect and his counsel once formal proceedings have been in-
itiated." 189
Jeff Yates was arrested pursuant to a warrant and incarcerat-
ed."" Since the issuance of an arrest warrant under Mississippi
law constitutes commencement of the prosecution, his sixth amend-
ment right to counsel had attached. 19 When Yates's attorney ar-
rived and was denied the opportunity to see his client or have him
182. Id. at 392.
183. Id. at 400.
184. Id.
185. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
186. Id. at 266.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 274-75.
189. Id. at 276.
190. 467 So. 2d at 884.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 161-67.
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informed of his presence, Yates's sixth amendment right to counsel
was violated.192
At this point, even before the interrogation had begun, Yates's
sixth amendment rights had attached, thus affording him the op-
portunity to speak with his counsel during this "critical period.""19
As the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized in Pendergraft v.
State19' and Tate v. State,"5 any period of time during the trial
that counsel is deliberately denied access to his client is critical
and could have a definite impact on the outcome of the proceed-
ings.196 Can it not be argued that when Yates's attorney was de-
nied access to him, this lack of counsel precipitated events that
would not have occurred but for the denial? It seems that regard-
less of when, after attachment, an attorney is denied access to
his client, any period of denial could be no less critical to the out-
come than another.
19 7
Also, as an evolving result of Massiah, Brewer and Henry, Yates
had a constitutional right to counsel after attachment. Once the
sixth amendment right to counsel has attached, the accused can-
not be approached by law enforcement officers or their agents
for the purpose of creating a situation likely to induce the accused
to make incriminating statements. 9 8 During Yates's interrogation
the sheriff knew that counsel was waiting downstairs but did not
inform Yates. This was obviously a deliberate elicitation of in-
criminating statements in the absence of his attorney which should
be considered illegal and render his confession inadmissible as
violating his sixth amendment right to counsel."99
The next issue is that of waiver. Regardless of the fact that Yates
did not know of his counsel's presence, did he effectively waive
his sixth amendment right to counsel in the interrogation room?2"
The answer, of course, is no. After right to counsel has attached
there can be no valid waiver unless the accused initiates contact
with law enforcement officers and expresses his desire to talk.
Justice Powell stated in Brewer:
[Tihe opinion of the Court is explicitly clear that the right to assistance of counsel may
192. This is analogous to the language in Massiah and the holding in Brewer. See supra text accompanying
note 184.
193. See supra note 26.
194. 191 So. 2d 830 (Miss. 1966).
195. 192 So. 2d 923 (Miss. 1966).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
197. See supra note 26.
198. 447 U.S. at 274-75.
199. See supra text at note 184.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
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be waived, after it has attached, without notice to or consultation with counsel .... We
would have such a case here if the State had proved that the police officers refrained from
coercion and interrogation [Christian burial speech] . . . and that Williams freely on his
own initiative had confessed the crime.
2
.1
If Yates had known or had been informed that counsel was there
requesting to see him and had then decided to waive his rights
by initiating contact, the waiver would have been valid. 20 2 But
because Yates was approached in the interrogation room, his in-
criminating statement was in violation of his sixth amendment right
to counsel and could not be used against him.203
But, in retrospect, unlike Yates, the other sixth amendment cases
discussed did not involve a renewed attempt on the part of the
defendant to reinstate his guilt. Massiah was under the protec-
tion of his attorney and had met with him several times when his
incriminating statements were made.2"' He did not later seek to
acknowledge these statements, or purge them of their taint.
Williams was instructed by his attorney not to say anything dur-
ing his car ride from Davenport to Des Moines. In spite of this
warning, he led police to the cite of the deceased victim. His state-
ments were made out of the presence of counsel, and the Court
concluded that his sixth amendment rights were violated. " 5 He,
like Massiah, did not try to reaffirm his guilt by making later ad-
ditional statements. "°6
Henry, after discovering that the statements he made to a paid
informant were going to be used against him, did not make addi-
tional statements to law enforcement officers. He, like the previ-
ous two defendants, kept quiet and asserted that his sixth
amendment right to counsel had been violated. 0 7
Jeff Yates was not informed of the presence of counsel when
his attorney arrived and was approached by law enforcement
officers after his right to counsel had attached. This violated his
sixth amendment rights and rendered his waiver invalid, thereby
requiring exclusion of his statement. He met with his attorney
early that same morning and was told that he did not have to sign
anything.2°  After his attorney had left, his sixth amendment right
to counsel was violated a second time when he was approached
again and a transcribed statement was placed in front of him. He
201. 430 U.S. at 413.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 401.
204. 377 U.S. at 203.
205. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 405-06.
206. Id. at 393-94.
207. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 268 (1980).
208. Abstract of Record, July 19, 1982, at 7.
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was asked to sign it and was told that it did not matter since it
would be used against him regardless." 9 He signed it. This tran-
script signature could not constitute a voluntary confession un-
der either the fifth or sixth amendment standards.210 However,
in the fifth amendment outcome, the court took into considera-
tion the totality of the circumstances to purge the waiver of any
primary illegality.21 When sixth amendment right to counsel has
attached, there must be no contact with the accused by law en-
forcement officers unless the accused initiates it. 12 After Jeff Yates
had met with his attorney, it was up to Yates to initiate further
contact with police officials in order to effectuate a valid waiver.
This is consistent with Brewer v. Williams.. in that Williams made
incriminating statements only after law enforcement officials ap-
proached him with the famous "Christian burial speech.""' Wil-
liams would have remained silent but for the intrusion by the
detective. Likewise, Yates would not have signed anything but
for the illegal contact and the persuasive language. In Brewer,
the statements were suppressed. In the present case, they were not.
In Cannaday v. State..5 the defendant's sixth amendment right
to counsel also had attached. She was approached by a police
officer and asked a question. She responded, incriminating her-
self. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that "[slince the ques-
tion was made without the benefit of the presence of her attorney,
Cannaday's Sixth Amendment rights were violated." 26 Jeff Yates
was also asked an incriminating question out of the presence of
his counsel after his sixth amendment rights had attached. He was
asked to sign his confession transcript. He responded as did Can-
naday "without the benefit of the presence of ... [his] attorney." 17
This violated Cannaday's sixth amendment rights to counsel but
not the sixth amendment rights of Yates.
In United States v. Shaw,218 the defendant made repeated re-
quests for FBI agents after his sixth amendment rights had at-
tached. The agents were hesitant to meet with him in the absence
of his attorney and did so only because the defendant had initiat-
209. 467 So. 2d at 885.
210. See supra note 79.
211. 467 So. 2d at 886.
212. See supra text accompanying note 198; see also United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 380 (5th Cir.
1983), reh'g denied, 714 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1983).
213. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
214. Id. at 392.
215. 455 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1984).
216. Id. at 723.
217. Id.
218. 701 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1983), rehg denied, 714 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1983).
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ed the contact."' He later made incriminating statements that were
used against him. In the present case, Jeff Yates in no way in-
itiated the contact with the officers.
Yates was approached and was induced to sign the transcript
"which . . . [police] had deliberately elicited from him . . . in
the absence of his counsel."220 Thus, again he was deprived of
his sixth amendment right to counsel. As the Court held in Brewer,
"the circumstances . . . in this case thus provide no reasonable
basis for finding that . . . [the accused] waived his right to the
assistance of counsel." 221
D. Comparison
In the fifth amendment outcome, Yates's rights were violated
when the incriminating statements he gave were tainted by the
refusal of the sheriff to inform him that his attorney was present.
The court held that this taint was purged when Yates again received
his Miranda warnings, conferred with counsel, and signed his con-
fession transcript.
2 2
The sixth amendment outcome would have produced a differ-
ent result. Yates was denied his sixth amendment right to coun-
sel twice, once when he was approached by police for the purpose
of obtaining a statement and again when he was confronted with
the transcribed statement. His right to counsel had attached, and
officials were illegally seeking information from him at a critical
period in the proceedings without a valid waiver. "23
The attachment of the sixth amendment right of counsel com-
mands a different result from the majority's opinion, because under
the sixth amendment, law enforcement officials are more reluc-
tant to approach or gain incriminating information from the ac-
cused than they are regarding fifth amendment Miranda rights.2
Miranda involves only statements made by an individual inter-
rogated while in police custody, 2 5 whereas the sixth amendment
extends to both custodial and non-custodial situations.26 Miran-
da usually involves interrogation procedures where the individu-
227'al claims he has been coerced by law enforcement officers,
219. Id. at 380.
220. 377 U.S. at 206.
221. 430 U.S. at 405.
222. 467 So. 2d at 886-87.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 208-21.
224. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 380 (5th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 714 F.2d 544 (5th
Cir. 1983).
225. 384 U.S. at 444.
226. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
227. 384 U.S. at 445.
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whereas the sixth amendment does not require interrogation at
all for a claim that it has been violated. 2 8
The purpose of the fifth amendment is to recognize an accused's
right to silence and his privilege not to incriminate himself.2 9 The
purpose of the sixth amendment is "to safeguard the fairness of
the trial and the integrity of the factfinding process."230 In sum-
mation, since the sixth amendment has a broader range than the
fifth amendment ,231 a different result would have been obtained
had the case been properly analyzed under the sixth amendment.
CONCLUSION
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-1-7 (1972)32 determines when a prose-
cution will commence in this state. The Mississippi Supreme Court
has failed to recognize this statute, thereby pushing back the time
when the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches. Since the
legislature has required earlier periods for the protection of sixth
amendment rights, the supreme court must adhere to its wishes.
If the court does not, it is acting beyond its scope of authority.
In so doing, the court has created its own law contrary to that
of the legislature. The court must realign itself and in the future
produce case precedent consistent with the law of the state.
John P. Frye
228. See supra text accompanying notes 172-74.
229. 384 U.S. at 460.
230. 430 U.S. at 426.
231. See, e.g., Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713, 722 (Miss. 1984).
232. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-1-7 (1972 and Supp. 1985).
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